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ABSTRACT
The attacks of September 11, 2001 in Washington (9/11), March 11, 2004 in Madrid
(11-M) and July 7 and 21 in London (7-J and 21-J) have turned security into the cen-
tral issue on international and regional agendas in North America and Europe, now
spreading to other regions of the world. As a result of the terrorist attacks, securi-
ty has developed into an important element of integration by becoming a catalyst
for agreements oriented to building security communities. The most complete rep-
resentation of the construction of a North American bloc can be seen in smart bor-
der agreements and in the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America.
Undoubtedly, the security component of North America as a region is increasing
and the framework for trilateral convergence exists. In the EU case, the concern
about safety was clearly the main basis of accords with a view to the approval of
the European Constitution, and it will also strengthen the integration process. Today,
consolidating the EU is a matter of security, so Europe is securitizing its agenda.
Key words: regional integration, security community, multidimensional security, terrorism,
securitization. 
INTRODUCTION
Based on their distinct underlying purposes and divergent paths of development
one might question the value in comparing the European Union (EU) and North
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America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Regardless of their levels of integration,
however, Europe and North America are two regions with economic, political and
social identities. The relatively recent construction and emphasis on immigration,
border control and terrorism, as security concerns are common to both regions and
are high on their political agendas. A comparison of the approaches each of the
regions has taken to address this issue will provide a framework for the study of
regional security.
The central hypothesis of this article is that as a result of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 (9/11) in Washington and New York, March 11, 2004 (11-M) in
Madrid, and July 7 and 21 (7-J and 21-J) in London, both in North America and in
the EU, security has developed into an important element of integration by becoming
a catalyst for agreements oriented either to generate –as in North America– or to
consolidate –as in the EU– regional identities in security matters which, together
with institutions and mechanisms, are building security communities in both places.
This new enemy, terrorism, of the most powerful nations of the international
system has forced them to reconsider their national security doctrines and redefine
the threats not only to the state but to their civilizing vision. The values of tolerance
and multicultural inclusion are being questioned and the design of defense strate-
gies of their values and ethos forces them to implement global foreign policies that
virtually securitizes1 their agendas, leading them to notions like preventive war,
smart borders and new intelligence systems that successfully take on this state task.
The events of 9/11 put pressure on the countries of North America to seek a
shared viewpoint, and a regional vision is gradually being acquired. The three
countries recognize common security problems and the existence of transnational
threats that cannot be treated independently. Given the increasing pressures to
make U.S. homeland security more efficient and effective, and considering the long
land borders shared with the United States, Mexico and Canada are currently in the
process of assimilating this national security doctrine through the strategy for
smart borders and the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP).
In the case of Europe, although it is true that during the 1990s the EU devel-
oped its common security and defense foreign policy project, skepticism concern-
ing its feasibility increased in the face of the lack of agreement and the break that
the war in Iraq represented. However, as of December 2003, as a result of the
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1 When speaking of the “securitization” of the international agenda, we are referring both to the primacy
of the issue of security and to the tendency to look at any issue through the lens of security. Krause defines
“securitization” as “a process whereby particular issues are related to the sphere of day-to-day politics by
specific groups of particular state elites who define them as security problems.” In this same sense, Barry
Buzan considers that the different sectors of state activity can be turned into security issues by the deci-
sions of the authorities (see Krause, cit. pos. Kirchner, 2004: 438; Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998).
European concern for reinforcing their multidimensional and multilateral vision of
regional and international security, important agreements on the matter started to
take form, a tendency that, no doubt, was bolstered after the 11-M attacks. From my
own perspective, the European Constitution was signed because the consolidation
of the EU became a security matter. That is, the European agenda became “securi-
tized”, a situation that has sharpened since the July 7 and 21 attacks.
The empirical references about the construction of security communities in North
America and the European Union clearly show that, even given their differences,
the multidimensional security agenda is increasingly eclipsed by the agenda of the
fight against terrorism, going so far as to threaten individual liberties, civil rights and
even the privacy of the individual as has happened in the United States, Canada
and the EU. Therefore, regionalism is faced with the challenge of preserving its se-
curity and at the same time promoting a development agenda in order to build a more
stable world whose priorities go way beyond the fight against international terrorism.
THE THEORETICAL DEBATE ABOUT SECURITY COMMUNITIES BUILDING
The Concept of Security
The predominance of the realist school in the explanation of security issues in inter-
national relations is a fact, and therefore security has traditionally been conceived
based on the military-political focus centered on the viability and the preservation
(survival) of the state. In this view, by definition, security “is and should be about
the state, and the state is and should be about security, with the emphasis on mili-
tary and political security” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998: 37), which creates
an indissoluble dialectic between the state and security.
As a result, during the Cold War, studies about security were practically centered
on matters related to the control, threat or use of force among States. Once the Cold War
ended, intellectuals noted the need for broadening the traditional concept of security
to include economic, environmental and social questions given that the nature of
threats to security were changing to include iternational phenomena like organized
crime, terrorist groups, multi-state or sub-national ethnic or religious movements, glob-
al matters like environmental deterioration or scarce resources and the growing
importance of regions and institutions as new actors in security (Schultz et al., 1997).
The classic concept of security centered on the military vision, on the viability
and safekeeping (survival) of the state, has evolved, giving rise to a broader con-
cept by incorporating new elements, although the state continues to be the main
reference point. From this perspective, security unfolds in several spheres: the mil-
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itary (related to the offensive and defensive capabilities of states and their percep-
tions regarding the others’ intentions); the political (referring to state organization,
adequate functioning of the institutions and their legitimacy/legality); the economic
(related to access to the necessary resources, markets and finances to sustain the wel-
fare of the population and state stability); the environmental (sustained development
promotion); and the social (such as society’s ability to maintain cultural and national
elements like language, religion and customs. See Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998). 
As Buzan indicates, in addition to meaning survival when the existence of the
state or a society is threatened, security “has to do with conditions of existence and
includes states’ ability to maintain their independent identity, their integrity and func-
tionality against forces seen as hostile” (Buzan, 1991: 432). Threats would be defined
as anything that undermines the stability, viability and existence of any sphere of
security. Besides traditional threats centered on the state (like external military aggres-
sion), threats of a transnational character also arise from non-state actors like inter-
national organized crime, terrorism, drug and illegal arms traffickers, corruption,
money laundering and the links among them. 
Classical Theories about International Security: 
The Realism/Liberalism Debate
As we have already pointed out, the realist school has dominated the explanation
of security issues in international relations, an influence clearly reflected in the def-
initions of national and international security. Among the main characteristics of
realism is situating the world as an anarchic system made up of States in a constant
quest for maximizing their power and in a constant struggle to guarantee their se-
curity even at the expense of other states. In this way, the clashes (the conflict) that
result from the competition among states are an intrinsic characteristic of interna-
tional relations. Since there is no effective communication among states, the only
way of seeking security is through military might (Baylis, 2004).
In this context, the concept of the “security dilemma” formulated by John Herz
in 1950 is especially significant: “a structural notion in which the self-help attempts
of states to look after their security needs tend regardless of intention to lead to ris-
ing insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and the
measures of others as potentially threatening” (Baylis, 2004).
Using the basic postulates of realism, the structural realists (neo-realists) accept
that cooperation among states can exist, but always within limits given that it is very
difficult to sustain. For the neo-realists, the post-Cold War international system is
characterized by mistrust and constant competition.
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From the perspective of authors like Waltz and Mearsheimer, international
institutions, the decisive underpinnings of the evolution of international relations,
are puppets of the great powers with marginal effects on the level of regulating the
behavior of state actors. From their perspective, the distribution of power in the
international system is a basic element for understanding it. Vis-à-vis this perspec-
tive, Stephen Walt and Charles Glaser think it more important to take into consid-
eration the level and type of threats to the existence of a state than the distribution
of power (Brown et al., 1995).
Up until here, we have delineated the main postulates of the realist paradigm.
From our perspective, given their conception about cooperation and international
institutions (always conditioned by the power of states and by factors such as
cheating and maximizing profits), and given their non-existent interest in the inter-
nal structures of states, this approach cannot explain the emergence of security
communities in Europe and North America, even if we based ourselves on the
premise that we are dealing with a strategy of a hegemonic state, like, for example,
the United States, to maximize its power in the international theater. Simply, the
tools that neo-realism can give us do not help us to explain the phenomenon.
In the case of the liberal paradigm for international relations, it is interesting to
explore the postulates of liberal institutionalism that, developed by, among other
authors, Keohane and Nye, accept the realist premise that the international system
is anarchic and definitely lacks a central regulatory body where states as rational
actors merely pursue their short-term interests. However, it does accept the possi-
bility of peaceful change, the agents of which are international institutions (Keohane
and Nye, 1977; Keohane, 1988 and 1989; Flemes, 2003).
According to Keohane and Martin, institutions facilitate cooperation to the
extent that they provide information, reduce transaction costs, channel distribution
conflicts and –most importantly– that they reduce the possibility for all actors of
being cheated by the others. However, neo-liberal institutionalism also bestows only
a limited importance on institutions with regard to tendencies for change in inter-
national relations, given that liberal neo-institutionalists share the basic premise of
neo-realism that institutions reflect the distribution of power in the international
system and are conditioned by it (Keohane and Martin, 1995; Flemes, 2003).
In addition, at the moment institutions are created, state actors are guided by
their own interests, their strategies and aspirations. In that sense, it is worth asking
whether international institutions can force national interests and identities consid-
erably. While liberal neo-institutionalism jettisons some of neo-realism’s premises
(the state as a single actor, power as the central motive), it continues to consider
states’ self-interest as the maxim that guides their behavior. Even in the case in
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which state actors guided by the principle of selfishness enter into institutionalized
negotiations, in the last analysis anarchy as a determining condition of interstate
relations cannot be overcome; the motives that lead to political cooperation that
goes beyond the casual convergence of interests of state actors does not find a sat-
isfactory explanation here (Flemes, 2003)
As we can observe, both paradigms come up against limitations when an
attempt is made to analyze the links between regionalism and security and, conse-
quently, the construction of identities, common values, institutions and regional
mechanisms that can deal with the challenges to security on all levels (individual,
local, state, regional and international). This is why it is necessary to explore new
theoretical outlooks in order to overcome the limitations in the classical theories
with regard to the regionalism-security relationship.
Regionalism and Security: The Construction of Security Communities
We know that optimal regional integration implies the consolidation of a common
identity in matters of foreign policy, security and the harmonization of the admin-
istration of justice. Without a doubt, the transnational nature of the threats and
challenges to domestic and international security has generated an ever greater
interdependence among states in this matter.
In a framework of uncertainty, world change and securitization of agendas in
which great inequality can be seen among the vast majority of countries and ter-
rorist attacks are systemic, regionalism is emerging in the beginning of this millen-
nium as the biggest option for the development and survival of the nation-state.
Not only that, but it becomes the priority space for designing and promoting secu-
rity since the threat from the potential old extra-territorial enemy has been replaced
by that new enemy who penetrates and reproduces itself domestically (homeland
security), whether through immigrants or generations of immigrants born on U.S.
or European soil.
The transnational nature of the threats causes the interdependence of state
security, making the regional the priority: political convergence and the will to
cooperate among different states are indispensable for the region to reinforce its
political-strategic character, thus reaffirming the geo-economic, geo-political and geo-
strategic nature of integration. This has translated into the development of security
communities, which later could translate into common identities, values, and per-
ceptions of the threats and the way to deal with them.
Authors from the European School, like Waever and Buzan, have worked on
the idea of security communities, developing the concept of regional security com-
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plexes, through which they highlight the importance of the regions in structuring
security levels. The regional security systems theory starts from an assessment guid-
ed by political realism of the international system’s anarchic nature and the inter-
dependence among states in security matters. According to this vision, thanks to
regional integration, we go from a group of anarchic states to stability when a sin-
gle actor is constituted in the international system.
From that perspective, during the 1980s and 1990s, we saw the gradual emer-
gence of a “mature anarchy” in which states recognized the immense damage that
could be caused by a continued arms race and aggressive competition in a nuclear
world. Thus, Buzan argues that there is growing recognition among “mature”
states of interdependence in security matters and that there are therefore numerous
(security) reasons to take into consideration the interests of neighboring states
(Baylis, 2004).
According to Buzan, a regional security complex is made up of a group of states
“whose main security perceptions and references are interconnected; therefore, they
cannot be reasonably analyzed or solved some of them independently from others”
and “whose securities are not sufficiently interdependent to render them a kind of
subsystem within the general model of international security” (Buzan, 1990: 13-14).
The construction and dynamics of security systems are the result of the inter-
dependence of their members, of the security perception each of them has, of the
distribution of power among them and of the friendship-enmity relationships
among them. 
In this way, regional security systems may be built and may function based on:
(a) the members’ negative vision, where interdependence arises from fear, distrust
and rivalry; (b) an intermediate position, in which States perceive threats among
themselves but reach agreements to reduce security problems amongst themselves
and coming from abroad. This model corresponds to the beginnings of European
Union construction; and (c) a positive vision, in which the states have no expecta-
tions or intentions of using force among themselves. This describes the develop-
ment of security identity in North America (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998).
Constructivism, for its part, considers many of the neo-realist premises valid,
such as accepting the anarchic nature of the international system and that states, the
main subject of study in international relations, generally have offensive capabili-
ties, cannot be absolutely certain about the intentions of other states, have an innate
desire for survival, and act rationally in the international system.2 However, in con-
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2 The term “constructivism” is used to describe an international relations research program that is an alter-
native to existing ones and was coined by Nicholas Onuf in 1989 in his work World of Our Making. This
current’s most representative author is Alexander Wendt, who in 1987 put forward the central issue of the
trast with the neo-realists, who see the international structure as a result of the dis-
tribution of material capabilities, the constructivists consider the international
structure a result of social structures constructed by different elements like knowl-
edge, material resources, norms and practices. In consequence, they consider that
the term “power policy” used by the neo-realists does not aid in describing inter-
state behavior, nor the fact that states are influenced in their international behavior
by other ideas like respect for the law and the importance of cooperation via insti-
tutions (Baylis, 2004; Salomón, 2004).
In this way, the constructivists like Wendt or Katzenstein understand inter-
state cooperation as a social process that can lead to a new interpretation of securi-
ty policy interests of the actors involved: the interactions among societies, the
acceptance of common norms and the construction of a transborder identity gener-
ate cooperation among the states (Katzenstein, 1996; Flemes, 2003).
Basing themselves on the reflections of Karl Deutsch about security communi-
ties developed in the framework of the Cold War, Emmanuel Adler and Richard
Barnett built their theoretical model about security communities focused on Euro-
pean construction. In this fashion, to completely understand the constructivist the-
oretical model of security communities, it is indispensable to refer to Deutsch’s
thinking, among the first attempts after World War II to deal with the possibility of
peaceful change in international relations. For Deutsch, states can overcome the basic
condition of anarchy in international relations through state and social interaction,
through processes of socialization that increasingly become transborder and through
growing common identities (Flemes, 2003). Common perceptions and the construc-
tion of collective identities are agents for peaceful change. These processes explain
why interdependence and mutual responsibility grow among states, which finally
lead to no longer considering the use of physical violence among them as a legiti-
mate conflict resolution mechanism (Adler and Barnett, 1998).
According to Deutsch, “A security community [...] is a group that has become
integrated, where integration is defined as the attainment of a sense of community,
accompanied by formal or informal institutions or practices, sufficiently strong and
widespread to assure peaceful change among members of a group with reasonable
certainty over a long period of time” (Deutsch, 1961: 98). 
Collective identities are the agents of pacific change, which explains why inter-
dependence and mutual responsibility among the states grow, finally leading to not
considering the use of physical violence among them a legitimate mechanism for
the resolution of conflicts (Flemes, 2003).
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constructivist view: the mutual constitution of social structures and agents in international relations (see
Salomón, 2004).
Basing themselves on Charles Tilly’s contribution to the study of communities,
Adler and Barnett define the security community using three elements: (a) members
of a community have shared identities, values and meanings; (b) those in a com-
munity have many sided and direct relations; and (c) communities exhibit recipro-
city (expressing some degree of long-term interest derived from knowledge of
those with whom one interacts) and perhaps even altruism (understood as a sense
of obligation and responsibility. See Adler and Barnett, 1998).
A sense of belonging appears to be closely interrelated with membership in a
political community that seems to offer protection from external threats (Clarke,
1993). Identity and security are relational concepts that imply the existence of an
“other” against which the notion of a collective self and conditions of insecurity are
articulated (Lipschutz, 1998). States identify positively with one another so that the
security of each is perceived as the responsibility of all. Identity implies a shared view
about security, defense and threats and a close sense of cohesion and solidarity.
Adler and Barnett acknowledge that there is great skepticism about political
actors being able to share values and standards and to come together in diverse and
reciprocal interactions that reflect long-term interests. These authors distinguish
between amalgamated security communities, characterized by the political merger
of their members, toward which the EU is moving, and pluralistic security com-
munities, in which the states maintain their independence and sovereignty, such as
the case of North America (Adler and Barnett, 1998).
Also, they distinguish between two ideal types of pluralistic security commu-
nities: the “loosely coupled” and the “tightly coupled”. While the loosely coupled
security community has a minimal definition (a transnational region made up of sov-
ereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change,
like NAFTA), the tightly coupled one is more demanding in two respects: (a) it has a
“mutual aid” society in which collective security system arrangements are made;
and (b) it possesses a regimen endowed with common supranational and transnation-
al institutions and some form of a collective security system (like in the European
case. See Adler and Barnett, 1998).
To explain how the development of a security community in general affects
relations among the member states and in particular their security policies, the
authors developed a security community model of evolution in three phases, which
I shall use to analyze the development of the security communities in North Amer-
ica and in the European Union.
1) Nascent. The governments do not make an explicit effort to achieve the con-
struction of a security community, “but they begin to consider how they
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might coordinate their relations in order to: increase their mutual security;
lower the transaction cost associated with their exchanges; and /or encourage
further exchanges and interactions”. Transnational and interstate interac-
tions are accompanied by the development of institutions and organizations
both to increase the assurance and knowledge of the ‘other’” (Adler and
Barnett, 1998: 50).
2) Ascendant. This phase is characterized by “increasingly dense networks, new
institutions and organizations that reflect either tighter military coordination
or cooperation, cognitive structures that promote ‘seeing’ and acting together,
and the deepening of the level of mutual trust.” Emerge of collective identi-
ties that encourage the expectation of peaceful change and of the develop-
ment of mutual responsibility (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 51).
3) Mature. In this phase “regional actors share a security identity, as well as in-
stitutions and mechanisms to defend it, and entertain dependable expectations
of peaceful change.” Security is perceived increasingly as a common good and
a security community comes into existence (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 55).
THE EUROPEAN UNION: A SECURITY COMMUNITY IN CONSOLIDATION
The Europe of the 25 has established the objective of being heard with a single voice
in international matters, by means of its Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), and
defending itself in a communitarian manner from the new threats through an Euro-
pean Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). 
At present, the European security community is clearly going from the ascen-
dant stage to the consolidation stage as a result of the new impetus that EU mem-
bers have given to security matters after 11-M, 7-J and 21-J and the challenges to
border security involved in the expansion to the East.
The Beginning
Civilian by nature, the European integration process has led to a security commu-
nity among European members. The disasters of World War II, the mutual percep-
tion of threat and the consensus on the need to reach agreements to reduce security
problems among Europeans, as well as those coming from outside, were the main
motivators for the gradual creation of a European identity in security matters.3 
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3 This effort has been in full effect since the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954. There is
no doubt that the main objective of the founders of the European communities was to avoid another war
Nevertheless, after the failure of the European Defense Community in the early
1950s, the defense option disappeared from the European integration process for a
long time. During the Cold War, European security, understood as the risk of a mil-
itary attack by the Soviet countries, was left to the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO).
The first steps toward coordination in matters of foreign policy were taken
after the Davignon Report, in 1970. The Single European Act of 1986 formalized the
system of consultations and coordination, and gave rise to intergovernmental, vol-
untary, not obligatory, foreign policy cooperation, with insufficient treatment of se-
curity and a total absence of defense issues.
The Ascending Stage
Although at the end of the Cold War the European Economic Community started to
appear as a first-rate actor in international economic matters, in political and military
matters it maintained a very low profile, as seen during the first Gulf War in 1991
and the wars of the Balkans.4 The development of a common European position in
foreign policy and security matters corresponded to the economic leadership role
that the EU was playing. The security debate in what was then the European Com-
munity tended toward recognizing the need to reinforce the system of cooperation
among member nations to include communication, information exchange and the
development of common principles, standards and regulations to prevent any aggres-
sive behavior and to provide the basis for collective action, conflict prevention, cri-
sis negotiations and the peaceful solution of controversies (Gärtner, Hyde-Price and
Reiter, 2001).
Added to the classic view of security, focused on political and military matters
dealing with the defense of national territory, were concerns about human rights,
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between Germany and its neighbors. This can be seen in the following: the Treaty of Dunkirk (signed on
March 4, 1947, by France and the United Kingdom, to keep Germany from becoming a threat to the secu-
rity of the signatory countries, as occurred after World War I); the Organization for the Defense of the
Western Union (created by France, the United Kingdom and the Benelux countries through the Treaty of
Brussels of March 1948, with the purpose of guaranteeing regional defense); the project of the European
Defense Community (the constitution of which was signed on May 27, 1952, by France, the United
Kingdom, the Benelux countries, Germany and Italy, which established the creation of a European army)
and the Western European Union, WEU (established in 1954 by the reform to the March 1948 Treaty of
Brussels, resulting in the commitment and aspirations of some European states, members of the European
Defense Community, to make sure that German re-armament was accepted by France by participating in
an institution backed by the United Kingdom).
4 In the case of the Gulf War, following a United Nations Security Council resolution, the military inter-
vention was carried out by the United States and was paid for by Japan and the European Economic
Community. With respect to the war in what was then Yugoslavia, it is important to note that the conflict
was solved after eight years by a U.S. military intervention within the framework of the NATO, and that it
did not have UN approval. 
the environment, political stability, democracy, social development, cultural and reli-
gious identity, as well as immigration issues. This gave rise to a series of discussions
on the definition of the concept of security.
During the 1990s, the development of a common approach to foreign policies,
security and defense, made important progress, thus entering into its ascending
stage, such as the strengthening of bonds, the creation of new institutions and the
establishment of a European security corps (Europol and Eurocorps).
In 1993, the European Union’s Treaty of Maastricht established the CFSP as a
second pillar of the union. The incorporation of the concept of common defense and
the creation of the post of CFSP High Representative would come with the Treaty of
Amsterdam, which went into effect in 1999. In that same year, the Cologne Summit
was held, where it was agreed that the European Union should absorb the military
powers of the Western European Union upon the development of the Rapid Reac-
tion Forces (Eurocorps).5
As a result of the European Councils of Helsinki (1999) and of Santa Maria de
Feira (2000), the members of the European Union established commitments for
improving EU military capacity and carrying out crisis negotiations missions. The
permanent political and military structures within the council (the Political and
Security Committee [COPS],6 the European Military Committee7 and the European
Military Staff 8) were established in the Summit of Nice in 2001. This summit agreed
that the European Union would absorb the functions of the Western European
Union (WEU), searching for the establishment of decision-making mechanisms in
accordance with the development of autonomous military capacities9 (the develop-
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5 France and Germany agreed it would be made up of between 50 000 and 60 000 troops and France and
Great Britain set the year 2003 as the deadline for them to be ready. 
6 Consisting of ambassadors of each member state meeting twice a week in Brussels. Its function is to man-
age developing crises, organize evaluation and planning and give political advice to the European
Council. In the event of the deployment of union military forces, it assumes political control of the day-
to-day leadership of military operations.
7 Officially made up of chiefs of defense staff of member countries but in practice attended by their military
delegates. It is the most senior military body and a forum for consultation and cooperation among mem-
ber states, and is responsible for giving advice and recommendations to the COPS and the European
Council, and issuing military directives to the European Military Staff.
8 Responsible for early warning, evaluating situations and strategic planning for Petersberg missions,
including the earmarking of national and international European forces. It gives military support to the
European Military Committee during the strategic planning phase of crisis management situations for the
complete range of Petersberg missions and develops working methods and operational concepts based on
or compatible with those of NATO. 
9 Their own force of 60 000, capable of deploying in 60 days and remaining deployed for a year, ready by
2003, in which all the states, except Denmark, would participate. “According to the ‘catalogue of forces’,
the 60 000 troops would be backed by 100 000 more, approximately 400 combat plans and 100 land facil-
ities. The force would be militarily autonomous and would have the capabilities of command, control and
intelligence. It would have logistic units and, during combat operations, would combine elements of the
air and sea forces. The member states also agree on cooperating by improving their intelligence capabili-
ties and air and sea transportation.” 
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ment of the Rapid Reaction Force), enabling the union to respond to the St. Peters-
burg missions (Gärtner, Hyde-Price and Reiter, 2001).10
Also decided at Nice was the creation of autonomous agencies that would
incorporate within the EU the WEU structures dealing with CFSP, like the Satellite
Centre and the Institute for Security Studies. These two agencies were officially cre-
ated by European Council Joint Actions in July 2001.
However, the debates among European Union members concerning its nature,
the European inability to deal with the Balkans problem, the incorporation of the
Eastern countries into NATO, and, above all, the European break with respect to
the conflict of Iraq in the midst of the United Nations and NATO all proved that the
European Union was far from reaching a true identity in security matters, due to its
incapacity to carry out independent, common military action. Apparently, after the
first moments of euphoria, the construction of the CFSP followed a course with ups
and downs that seemed to condemn it to failure. 
The differences with regard to relations with NATO may be a clear example of
the differences inside the EU about security and defense. In the framework of the
so-called European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) inside NATO, the differences
between Europeanists and Atlanticists could be clearly seen: while Great Britain
called for cooperation and complementary action between the ESDP and NATO,
France and Germany argued that cooperation could only be achieved once Europe
developed its own defense capabilities.11 In consequence, the ESDI “never became an
alternative to NATO since all the European actors, including France, have been reluc-
tant to replace U.S. military leadership” (Arteaga, 1999: 33).
Finally, European clashes over the Iraq conflict demonstrated the limitations
and inconsistencies of the CFSP, showing that community action in matters of for-
eign policy, security and defense continued to be an ideal to the extent that the EU’s
member states made their decisions based on their own interests, this time clearly
defined as a function of their alliance with the United States and not as a function
of European identity and construction.
10 Humanitarian and evacuation missions, peace-keeping missions and combat force missions for crisis
negotiations, including civilian aspects of four kinds: police, strengthening of the rule of law, reinforce-
ment of civil administration and civil protection. These forces shall be based on the Eurocorps and shall
imply greater expenses and responsibilities for the states in the area of defense.
11 After 1991, the concept of ESDI was developed as the European pillar inside NATO in order to develop capa-
bilities different from but not separate from NATO, identify assets, capabilities, planning mechanisms and
command structures in the North Atlantic alliance that could be used by European allies in response to
crises of peace missions, completing them with Joint/Combined Operational Forces, seeking the estab-
lishment of mobile, self-sufficient general headquarters that could be deployed on short notice in the area
of operations. The ESDI was reinforced in Washington in 1999 with the establishment of the Defense Capa-
bilities Initiative designed for joint operations by the states and to modernize allied capabilities for dealing
with new security challenges. The idea is that the ESDI would play a dual role by becoming the EU’s defen-
sive component and taking charge of Europe’s participation in NATO in order to avoid duplicating efforts.
Encouragement for Consolidation: From the Iraq War to 11-M. 
The “Securitization” of the European Agenda
From the War in Iraq to 11-M: The Accords about the Constitution
The Iraq crisis produced a common awareness among Europe’s leaders of the need
for strategic thinking on international security issues. There is also the general
recognition that a divided Europe is powerless (Haine, 2005).
During the discussions on the draft Constitution, one of the main accords
reached among members was precisely related to EU security and defense policy,
thereby commencing the healing of the break opened with the conflict in Iraq (Cha-
nona, 2004).
In an Intergovernmental Conference held in Naples, Italy, in December 2003,
EU members agreed to work out a common view on European defense based on the
development of military capabilities (by creating a European Armament, Research
and Military Capabilities Agency) and complementariness with NATO, thereby over-
coming the old rivalries between pro-Allies and pro-Europeans. 
According to the text of the draft Constitution, approved in Brussels, the EU
“shall conduct a common foreign and security policy, based on the development of
mutual political solidarity among Member States, the identification of questions
of general interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of conver-
gence of Member States’ actions,” and, “before undertaking any action on the in-
ternational scene or any commitment which could affect the Union’s interests, each
Member State shall consult the others within the European Council or the Council
of Ministers” (European Convention, 2003: art. 39).
Moreover, the Constitution states that the common security and defense policy
“shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on assets civil and
military” to which they may resort “on missions outside the Union for peace-keep-
ing, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with
the principles of the United Nations Charter” (European Convention, 2003: art. 40).
Notable among the accords in that regard is the solidarity clause12 and the
approval of a rider protocol referring to the development of combat units13 and
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12 The solidarity clause is contained in article 42 of the draft Constitution: “The Union and its Member States
shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the victim of terrorist attack or natural or man-
made disaster. The Union shall mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources
made available by the Member States, to: prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States;
protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; assist a Member State
in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack, and assist a Member
State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a disaster.”
13 It was agreed that by the year 2007, the EU shall have combat units organized on the basis of a tactical
plan as a combat formation with the support elements, including logistical transport. These units will
incorporating the concept of “structured cooperation” under which those countries
who wish to may go further than the rest in this respect, as they did at the time of
the single currency or the Schengen space for removing borders, undertaking to
meet a series of conditions as soon as the future Constitution enters into effect (slat-
ed for 2006), such as developing greater military capabilities and participating, if
necessary, in multinational forces, as well as taking part in the European programs
for the development of military equipment and in the European Armament Agency
(El Mundo, 2003).14
Another important element in the consolidation of the security community in
Europe is, without a doubt, the ESDP operations. Numerous analysts have said that
the operability of the ESDP became a reality in 2003 when more than 2 000 European
police and military participated in four operations: the European Union Police
Mission in Bosnia (EUPM), Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM), Operation Artemisa in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and a second police mission, Proxima in FYROM.
Clearly, March 11 will be remembered by all of us as Europe’s day of terror. The
Madrid train attacks marked a watershed in the European process: they shook the
whole of Europe, renewing the enthusiasm for the Constitution. Unity is now an
element of security –a weapon against terrorism. The driving force behind the
approval of the European Constitution was determined by the importance of secu-
rity for Europe after 11-M.
The 11-M attacks have encouraged most countries to give a sign of unity and
progress in the European construction process. In point of fact, the central themes
of the Brussels Council meeting held March 25 and 26, 2004, were terrorism and the
Constitution, even though the gathering’s main topic was supposed to have been
the revision of the Lisbon Strategy, regarding the union’s economic development.
Hence, the contents of the agenda that will allow the union to become the most
dynamic economic region by 2010 were subsumed under the issue of security, spe-
cifically terrorism. The March 25, 2004 declaration on combating terrorism and the
establishment of a counter-terrorism coordinator give the impression that the union’s
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have to be able to maintain themselves by their own means for an initial period of 30 days, extendable to
at least 120.
14 Each country that wishes to join the European defense initiative will have to meet certain requirements,
such as being able to deploy 1 500 soldiers so that they will be available in just 10 days at a distance of
4,000 kilometers and stay there for a period of between 30 and 120 days. Currently, these conditions are
only met by four member states: the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Germany. The other members of
the EU have until 2007 to develop their capabilities. Furthermore, participating states will have to spend
an as-yet-unspecified amount on military equipment, which will have to be harmonized and inter-oper-
ative, without prejudice to their NATO commitments.
work in the fight against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion and organized crime is entering a new era.
Thus, the forward thrust of the consolidation of the EU security community is
determined by the terrorist attacks of March 11, 2004 in Madrid and July 7 and 21,
2005 in London. While the attacks on the trains in Madrid were a watershed in the
European process because they shook all of Europe, renewing enthusiasm about
the Constitution because of the idea that unity was a matter of security, the attacks
on London unleashed member states’ greater political determination to advance in
building the community, with Islamic terrorism seen as the main threat to be com-
bated, which may at the same time be a threat against the broader vision of (multi-
dimensional) security that the EU had been championing during its integration
process.
The European Definition of Security and Threats
The EU continues to build its security identity concept based on the liberal institu-
tionalism paradigm anchored in an institutional structure of laws and cooperation,
substituting the struggle for power by placing the priority on diplomacy, coopera-
tion and international law and by paying attention to the importance of the non-
military dimensions of security. In that vein, the European model is betting on the
construction of a stable world via the utilization of cooperation instruments for
developing and promoting human rights.15
In the December 12, 2003 Council of Brussels meeting, the text of the first
European Security Strategy, drawn up by CFPS High Representative Javier Solana,
was approved. For the first time, the EU identified the threats to its security and the
lines of defense that it will put forward. 
The threats were identified using the multidimensional concept of security; hence
poverty, pandemics and competition for natural or energy resources were incor-
porated along with terrorism, international organized crime, the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and regional conflicts such as the Middle East. 
As for the lines of defense, the document states that the EU must develop the
capacity to send missions to distant places and contribute to international security
by exercising effective multilateralism, international cooperation and the strength-
ening of multilateral institutions. Also, the importance of the Atlantic Alliance is
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15 One example of this are the 500 million euros contributed yearly since 1996 to Latin America, an amount
that represents 45 percent of the development resources sent to the region, and the 106 million euros sup-
plied in 2002 to projects in the framework of the European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights,
whose objective is to promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law.
ratified and a commitment to develop prevention is established: Europe, Solana
stated, “should be capable of implementing the full spectrum of its political and
economic instruments, as well of its member states, to launch diplomatic initiatives,
to conduct civilian, police or military operations, before countries around us dete-
riorate, before humanitarian emergencies arise or when signs of proliferation are
detected” (Solana, 2003a).
The EU security strategy clearly states that the EU and its member states will
tackle their security priorities in a framework that emphasizes multilateral institu-
tions and the respect for international law. The strategy stressed that Europe can no
longer remain hesitant and divided if it is to meet the promise of its origins, as a
community of democracies interested in building a stable regional security com-
munity, in its external relations. It argued that active engagement is also in Europe’s
security interests since these are affected by poor governance, insecurity, poverty
and conflicts far beyond its borders. Europe must therefore meet these challenges,
which it is well placed to do with a range of diplomatic, development, economic,
humanitarian and military instruments (Solana, 2003b).
The EU has three key strategic objectives in applying its external instruments
to meet contemporary security challenges: 
(a) Extending the security zone on Europe’s periphery through the creation of a
“ring of friends” around Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. Based on
a series of shared values such as democracy and human rights, the EU fosters a
market and open border policy, as well as the strengthening of cooperation in
areas like research, transportation, energy, conflict prevention and strength-
ening the rule of law. This strategy, whose ultimate end is to guarantee the
area’s stability, includes the possibility of rapid troop deployment, human-
itarian assistance, policing operations, reinforcing the rule of law and eco-
nomic aid.
United Nations operations during 2003 were the result of this strategy:
the European Union Police Missions in Bosnia and Concordia and Proxima
in the Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia.
(b) Supporting the emergence of a stable and equitable international order, par-
ticularly an effective multilateral system; through its active participation in
the reform of the United Nations and the international financial agencies,
and
(c) Seeking effective countermeasures to new and old threats (Haine, 2004).
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However, the terrorist attacks of March 11, 2004 in Madrid (and July 7 and 21
in London have been watersheds in the European conception of security. At the
same time that it fosters unity and validates the idea that common focuses on secu-
rity and defense must be developed, the European Union has redefined its threats:
Islamic terrorism is now the main threat to European security. Unfortunately, signs
are beginning to appear that the EU might be abandoning its broader vision of mul-
tidimensional security in favor of the fight against Islamic terrorism on a regional
and global level.
The Fight against Terrorism: A New Priority on the European Agenda
For years Europe has been the victim of terrorism by groups like the Red Brigades
in Italy, the Baader Meinholf gang in Germany, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)16 in
Spain and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland. Since 1979, when
the first Police Working Group on Terrorism was set up, the EU has recognized that
terrorism is a transnational problem necessarily requiring cooperation among states
to be dealt with. In the current international system, conflict, understood as a war
between two states, has been transformed into a fight against organizations, small
groups who act outside state control and who challenge the stability of states and
their national security systems.
Following the events of 9/11, the extraordinary European Council of Septem-
ber 21, 2001 stated that it would fight terrorism in all its forms and that “the fight
against terrorism will, more than ever, be a priority objective for the EU.” Among
other things, the EU undertook to strengthen cooperation among the authorities in
charge of combating terrorism (i.e. Europol and Eurojust and the police services).
In the European Council meeting at Laeken, the member states undertook to
strengthen cooperation between the expert services in the fight against terrorism
and to find a common definition of terrorist crimes. In June 2002, the Seville Euro-
pean Council approved a framework decision aimed at harmonizing member states’
legislations, establishing minimum standards on sentencing.
Although solidarity with the United States was complete, even including sup-
port for the invasion of Afghanistan in the United Nations, the differences about the
ways to combat terrorism emerged with the war in Iraq, opposed by France and
Germany, creating a break both in NATO and in Europe.
However, the nature and perception of terrorism changed since the Madrid
and London attacks, after which the EU has stated that Islamic terrorism17 is the
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16 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna means “Basque Country and Freedom” in Basque.
17 The term Islamic terrorism refers to terrorist acts practiced by a vast group of organizations and ten-
dencies who are followers of Islam and tend to articulate, one way or another, religion and politics. The
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main threat to its security, bringing it closer to the vision of security the United
States has championed since 9/11. 
Given the demand for responses to the terrorist threat by organizations like Al-
Qaeda, after the 11-M terrorist attacks, community leaders approved the strategic
plan designed by the justice ministers on March 19, 2004, which includes a series of
responses such as strengthening cooperation in intelligence and measures for sharing
up international policing activities, improving measures for freezing accounts
linked to suspicious groups and giving priority to the care of victims of extremism.
CFPS High Representative Javier Solana stated:
One priority is better intelligence-sharing. More information must be exchanged more
quickly [...we] must implement fully and without delay legislative measures such as the
European arrest warrant [...] accelerate the strengthening of border controls and docu-
ment security. And we must look again at our existing curbs on the financing of terror-
ism (Solana, 2004).
Furthermore, the Heads of State created the post of the European counter-ter-
rorism coordinator, appointing Gijs de Vries, a former Dutch interior minister, who
acts under the instructions of Javier Solana. In June 2004, Solana announced that
internal security services are to provide intelligence on terrorism to the Joint
Situation Centre (SitCen), part of the EU’s emerging military structure. At the same
time he revealed that the external intelligence agencies had been cooperating with
SitCen since early 2002. These moves were clearly needed since attempts to bring
together meaningful intelligence on terrorism through Europol were doomed to
failure: internal security and external intelligence agencies are loath to share infor-
mation with police agencies (Müller, 2003).
In November 2004, the EU Council approved The Hague Programme: Strengthening
Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union to respond jointly to the challenges
of terrorism, illegal migration and international organized crime, guaranteeing at
the same time respect for individual rights and freedoms and underlining the prin-
ciple of solidarity and shared responsibility among member states. The program
jihad or “Holy War” is the effort to extend the sovereignty of Muslim power. However, it must be said:
Islam is not responsible for terrorism. The East and the West are undoubtedly two different cultures, two
different world views, but that does not mean that they necessarily must be enemies to the death
who generate violence and war, when it is proven that the marginalization caused by the world eco-
nomic system and the use and abuse of power in the interest of the few are what have detonated a great
many of humanity’s conflicts. Islam is a form of rethinking the Western identity and its place in the
world to the point of the idea taking root that the West is only one more civilization among others. See
Sayyid, 1997.
puts special emphasis on strengthening the EU’s external borders through the joint
creation and establishment of biometric and police control in order to safeguard
community security.
In order to achieve optimal exchange of information among Europeans, the
Program incorporates the “principle of availability” which foresees the possibility
that by the year 2008 any state agency requiring some kind of information from
another member state can obtain it (European Council, 2004).
Finally, in a December 2004 meeting of the European Council, the 25 members
of the European Union committed themselves to encourage judicial collaboration,
intelligence services, border security and the struggle against the financing of
terrorism. The council also approved a Global Action Plan against Terrorism dur-
ing 2005.
Despite the national and community efforts to prevent another attack like 11-M,
London was hit by terrorism on July 7 and 21, 2005. Europe’s reaction to this new
onslaught has been prompt, once again putting the issue of the fight against terror-
ism front and center on the European agenda as a priority. In accordance with the
Declaration of the Extraordinary Session of the Justice and Internal Affairs Council,
held July 13 in Brussels, the EU considers this attack by Islamic terrorism an assault
on the universal values upon which European construction is based, such as the
commitment to democracy, the rule of law and cultural pluralism. For this reason,
they once again agreed to take the actions necessary to fight terrorism, maintaining
respect for freedom, security and justice (European Union, 2005).
However, the measures for safeguarding European territory could go the other
way. In addition to reinforcing border surveillance, deciding to “shoot to kill” any
terrorist suspect and proposing to increase the maximum time of incommunicado
detention stipulated by the anti-terrorist law from 15 days to three months, England
has proposed that the EU control Internet and cell phones. France decided to step up
surveillance along its borders and legislate about anti-terrorism, while the Italian
government announced that in the case of terrorist attack, the army will assume
police functions (meanwhile soldiers are empowered to set up highway checkpoints,
identify suspects and conduct searches and confiscate different items).
Another important aspect of the 7-J and 21-J attacks is that they were carried
out by immigrants living in the country who joined extremist Islamic groups, thus
opening up a greater challenge for European democracies. How can tolerance and
pluralism be maintained? How can young immigrants be prevented from seeing
terrorism as a form of protest against marginalization, as a war?
While this concern is reflected in several EU documents when they state the
importance of preventing people from turning to terrorism, locating the factors that
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contribute to radicalization and the recruitment to terrorist groups,18 the strategies
for achieving this have not been defined. We know that France announced the
scheduling of joint flights with Spain and Germany to expel illegal immigrants, but
this is not a real solution for the problem. Factors like the growth of the migrant
population, religious radicalism and high unemployment had already established
themselves in the European collective consciousness as sources of new tensions,
something which becomes more serious with the terrorist attacks on Madrid and
London.
Immigration and Border Control
Regional integration in the EU has been accompanied by the reinforcement of clos-
ing borders to illegal immigration. Population growth, political instability, religious
radicalism and the high unemployment rate have become sources of new tensions.
Border surveillance has become increasingly important after the expansion toward
the East: in addition to the increase in migratory pressure, authorities fear terrorists
and members of the mafias and organized crime from Eastern Europe and Russia
will enter the EU.
The European Union defines immigration as one of the dangers to combat,
together with drug trafficking and organized crime. In general terms, EU states’ im-
migration policies and strategies are based on three points: control of residents,
expulsion of persons with irregular or illegal migratory status and border control. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam conferred powers on the community in matters of
migration and asylum. In 2000 and 2001, several bills were proposed or adopted for
developing a common policy on asylum and migration by 2004 at the latest. 
The aim of community policy regarding EU external borders is to set up inte-
grated management ensuring a high and uniform level of checks on persons and
surveillance as a prerequisite for establishing an area of freedom, security and justice. 
In its May 2002 communication entitled “Towards integrated management of
the external borders of the Member States of the European Union”, the commission
advocated setting up an “external borders practitioners’ common unit” tasked with
managing operational cooperation on the external borders of member states. The
plan for managing the external borders of EU member states agreed by the council
on June 13, 2002 endorsed setting up an external borders practitioners’ common
unit as a means of establishing integrated management of the external borders. 
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18 This idea appears both in the Hague Programme and in the declaration from July 13, 2005 meeting of the
Justice and Internal Affairs Council.
Within the framework of the Thessalonica Summit held in June 2003, European
Union heads of state agreed on a series of projects to reinforce the fight against illegal
immigration with a system of visas, collaboration with sending countries and greater
border control. To do this, the creation of the European Agency for the Management
of External Borders was proposed, with joint financing of actions fostering security
along the European Union’s external borders. 
Finally, the European Agency for the Management of External Borders began
operations January 1, 2005. The new agency’s mission will be to facilitate the appli-
cation of existing and future community measures concerning management of the
EU’s external borders by coordinating member states’ actions to implement them.19
However, in the framework of the migratory crisis that Spain and Holland
have gone through in recent months, the agency’s activities have been harshly crit-
icized by those who think it still does not have the necessary resources, nor the
political will of the members to coordinate with each other and protect the EU’s
external borders, especially with regard to undocumented immigration, considered
today one of the main threats to European stability and security. In that context, on
October 27, 2005, at an informal summit at Hampton Court, Europe’s leaders gave
their support to an integral plan to control illegal immigration presented by Rodrí-
guez Zapatero. This plan’s aims are: (a) more effective, integral control of external
borders; (b) concluding EU accords for the readmission of immigrants who arrived
illegally from their home countries; (c) incorporating policies to support immigration
in community relations both with EU neighboring countries and immigrants’ home
countries, and (d) broadening cooperation for the development of sub-Saharan Africa
so it can resolve its own problems (Egurbide, 2005).
Another aspect that should be considered is, given the possibility of being the
target for terrorist attacks like those in London and Madrid, the risk that EU mem-
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19 The main tasks of the agency are: (a) to coordinate operational cooperation between member states
regarding surveillance and control of the external borders; (b) to develop a common integrated risk
assessment model and prepare general, or specific, risk assessments; (c) to help member states train their
national border guards by providing European-level training, holding seminars and offering additional
training to competent authorities; (d) to follow developments in research into the control and surveillance
of external borders (e.g. research into detection systems for illegal immigrants concealed in cars, trucks
or trains, etc.); (e) to assist member states in circumstances requiring increased technical and operational
assistance at their external borders: this may involve deploying experts on control and border surveillance
or providing technical equipment. It should be noted that experts on secondment would not have any law-
enforcement powers in the member states to which they were seconded and that the specific situations
identified in the regulation would not cover a massive, temporary inflow of nationals from third countries;
and (f) to coordinate operational cooperation among member states regarding the removal of third-coun-
try nationals residing illegally in the member states: the agency would provide the member states with
the necessary technical assistance, for example by setting up a network of contact points, by keeping an
up-to-date inventory of existing and available resources and facilities or by preparing specific guidelines
and recommendations on joint return operations. 
bers could decide to close their borders to persons from the Schengen region, as
France did after the London attacks. However, the political will to protect the com-
munity space has prevailed in the framework of the consolidation of the EU security
community. As a result, from the perspective of European leaders, the construction of
a space of freedom, security and justice in the EU implies strengthening trust among
EU members, increasing the fight against clandestine migration, intensifying the
fight against terrorism and surveillance of the union’s external borders.
The European Defense Agency
Given the traditional divergences among member states on armaments issues, the
establishment of a European Defense Agency in less than two years is an impres-
sive achievement.
On June 2003, the European Council at Thessalonica, Greece instructed appro-
priate council bodies to undertake the necessary actions in 2004 to create an inter-
governmental agency in the field of defense capabilities development, research,
acquisition and armaments. On November 17, the EU Council decided to create an
Agency Establishment Team to prepare the establishment of an agency.
Finally, the Second Meeting of the European Agency’s Steering Board, held on
November 24, 2004, approved the agency’s first annual budget (20 million) and the
annual work program. The agency achieved “operational” status by the end of the year
and has four functions: (a) defense capabilities development; (b) armaments cooper-
ation; (c) the European defense technological and industrial base and defense equip-
ment market; and (d) research and technology (European Union, November 22, 2004).
HAS NAFTA BEEN A NASCENT PLURALISTIC
SECURITY COMMUNITY SINCE 9/11?
North American integration undoubtedly has peculiar characteristics, such as the
asymmetry among its members, the clear hegemony of the United States and the pre-
eminence of bilateral relations (United States-Canada/United States-Mexico) over
trilateral ones. North America has become a real region due to reasons of security, eco-
nomic advantages and political interests, generating the idea of consolidating a North
American Community by deepening NAFTA (Chanona, Roy and Dominguez, 2004). 
The events of 9/11 put pressure on the countries of North America to seek a
shared viewpoint, and that regional vision is gradually being acquired. The three
countries recognize common problems regarding security and the existence of
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transnational threats that cannot be treated independently, although it is true they
have opted for paused, thematic, practical and immediate work at a bilateral level
(United States-Canada/United States-Mexico) encouraged by the United States’
immediate needs.
We can argue that in North America, a pluralistic security community, under-
stood as a transnational region formed by sovereign states that maintain expecta-
tions of pacific changes, is being developed (Adler and Barnett, 1998). The regional
security system in North America will be built starting from mutual confidence and
interdependence (what Buzan calls “positive vision”), but it will respond, in prin-
ciple, to the United States’ immediate needs: safeguarding U.S. territory, especially
from a potential terrorist attack. 
In North America, the differentiated use the United States makes of its hege-
mony is clear: when dealing with regions like Africa or the Middle East it has
favored, and even carried out, actions, unilaterally exercising its military strength,
whereas with its North American partners it has successfully moved toward the
search for plans to cooperate, generating channels for dialogue in an effort to reach
viable agreements. Mexico and Canada have taken advantage of this in negotiations
in order to prevent the unilateral measures of U.S. hegemony from affecting vital
areas such as trade and personal life, due to the virtual closing of the borders.20
Historically, Canada21 and Mexico22 have designed their national sovereignty
and survival principles without disputing U.S. hegemony, although they tend to
remain distant with respect to certain regional or hemisphere questions when their
independence is at stake. Mexico and Canada share some positions like the multi-
dimensional concept of security, the promotion of multilateralism or the struggle
against antipersonnel land mines. 
Canada’s North American identity is firmly established, and it clearly recog-
nizes U.S. leadership in the region. For the United States, Canada is a trustworthy
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20 However, Mexico-U.S. relations have been under high tension recently. Condoleezza Rice’s announce-
ment, Tony Garza´s letter to the Mexican government and the CIA director’s statement about the possi-
bility of political and social instability during the coming presidential campaign have caused a lot of
trouble for the Mexican government. 
21 Traditionally, Canada has determined its defense strategy taking into account at least five points: 1) Ca-
nada defines itself as “non-militarist”, preferring peaceful means for solving controversies; 2) Canadian
strategy does not develop the classic elements of self-sufficiency in defense matters; 3) the role of the
Canadian armed forces is to support internal bodies, that is, the army’s objectives are not only military;
4) Canada is aware of the need for strong cooperation with the United States in matters of defense, due
to its geographic location; and 5) Canada designs its defense policy without autonomy vis-à-vis U.S.
defense policy (Murray, 1994). 
22 Historically, Mexico’s security and defense policies have been nationalist and defensive. Throughout the
twentieth century it has developed its foreign policies based on the principles of non-intervention and
respect for the sovereignty of states and international law, thus maintaining its diplomatic independence
in the international realm and at the same time protecting its special relation with the United States.
partner. Relations between the United States and Canada in security and defense
matters have historically been characterized by proximity and cooperation,23 as
demonstrated by the more than 80 agreements about defense that the two countries
have signed (although they maintain some differences such as the position on Cuba
and the conception of human security, one of the principal axes of Canadian foreign
policy). 
What is more ambiguous is Mexico’s North American identity. This country
has been part of the North America concept only for the last decade, an identity rat-
ified with the signing of NAFTA. At present, no matter what issue we analyze with-
in the context of Mexico-U.S. relations, national security predominates in relation to
all the matters of high politics. 
In security matters, the most complete representation of the construction of a
North American bloc is seen in the smart border agreements and in the Security and
Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP). They go far beyond the technical
aspects that supposedly support them and imply collaboration in intelligence and
migration policies that guarantee security in the territorial proximity of the United
States, which enables it to project its military power to the rest of the world. 
A Shared North American Point of View about Security and Threats?
Although there is no shared vision of the North American countries on security and
the threats to it, we can find minimum agreements in the matter derived from the
United States’ immediate needs, such as the importance of border security and
the struggle against international organized crime, specifically terrorism, drug
and arms trafficking, recognized by Mexico and Canada as threats to their security.
After the events of 9/11, the United States initiated a new security doctrine that
for the first time centers its attention on the security and defense of its territory
(homeland security and homeland defense), restructuring its domestic and international
systems to deal with non-conventional threats to its security, specifically terrorism.
Homeland security implies the prevention, prediction of, elimination and defense
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23 Historically, Canada has maintained cooperative relations in security matters with its southern neighbor.
Mechanisms like the North America Defense Treaty, the Bilateral Consultant Group on Cooperation
against Terrorism, the Terrorist Interception Program of both countries (TIP), the United States and
Canada Forum on Transborder Crime, the groups directed by the immigration service and customs known
as Border Vision and the information exchange agreements between the United States Drug Control
Administration and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police are proof of this close cooperation. The Bilateral
Consultation Group for Antiterrorist Cooperation has coordinated efforts in the struggle against terror-
ism. The establishment of the Ad-Hoc Committee of Ministers in Public Security and Antiterrorism,
presided over by Minister of Foreign Affairs John Manley, and the approval of the Antiterrorist Act, in
September and December 2001, respectively, were clear signs of the Canadian commitment to the antiter-
rorist struggle. 
against any aggression to the territory, sovereignty, population and infrastructure
of the United States, as well as the management of crises and other national emer-
gencies, which the new National Territory Security Office will be in charge of.
The new U.S. military doctrine is not based on nuclear threats but rather on a
measure of the military capacity to prevent and react against any unexpected threat
or attack. In this doctrine, what the United States accepts is the new nature of its
enemies. Terrorists are not afraid of nuclear dissuasion; as a result, the country has
developed new forms and more effective means of dissuading.
The new strategy contained in the Unified Command Plan is based on the aware-
ness of all the weak points in the U.S. defense system, such as the lack of a defense
system against ballistic missiles, which constitutes in itself an initiative for the devel-
opment of weapons of mass destruction and the means to start them (Rumsfeld, 2002).
The United States has identified terrorism as the main threat against its securi-
ty, together with the traditional transnational threats such as organized crime and
drug trafficking. The United States has insisted at international meetings that issues
like poverty, pandemics and the environment, among others, are not part of the
security agenda, due to the fact that they “debase” the concept of security.
Canada and Mexico’s perceptions about their security and threats to it coincide
to the extent that both countries subscribe to its multi-dimensional character. Since
the 1990s, the Canadians have emphasized the dimension of individual security,
and therefore one of the characteristics of Canadian foreign policy has been to pro-
mote human security.24
Based on the recognition that terrorism is not the only security risk on a nation-
al, regional and world level, in April 2004, the Canadian government announced
the document Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy, a strategic
framework and plan of action for ensuring the country’s security.
In this document, the Canadian government points to three vital interests in mat-
ters of security: 1) protecting Canada and Canadians both inside and outside their ter-
ritory; 2) ensuring allied countries that Canada is not a base for threats against them;25
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24 Since the 1980s, studies on security paid more attention to the individual, using the concept of human secu-
rity, promoting a multidimensional understanding of the term including matters such as the environment,
social development, extreme poverty and pandemics like HIV/aids. In 1993, the United Nations Program for
Development (UNDP) coined the concept of human security which was extensively expanded in the 1994
Human Development Report. According to the UNDP, the concept of human security has two main compo-
nents: (a) safety from chronic threats like hunger, disease and repression, and (b) protection against sudden
or violent changes in one’s way of life. Human security includes seven categories: economic, political, food,
health, environmental, personal and community security. Proponents insist that the concept of security
urgently needs to be changed in two ways: from an exclusive focus on territorial security to greater empha-
sis on individuals’ security, and from security through arms to security through human development.
25 This means making the allies secure in the knowledge that Canada does not harbor terrorists who could
plan attacks from its territory and that it can control other kinds of threats to international security.
and 3) contributing to international security. With regard to security threats, terror-
ism occupies first place, followed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
international espionage, natural disasters, the vulnerability of strategic infrastruc-
ture, organized crime and, finally, pandemics, excluding poverty and migration from
the list (Canadian Government, 2004).
In the case of Mexico, according to the 2000-2006 National Development Plan,
“The main objectives of national security are to ensure the protection and conser-
vation of the collective interest, avoiding as far as possible or minimizing any risk
or threat to the physical integrity of the population and to institutions.”
Ratifying the multidimensional vision of security, the National Development
Plan points out that “the real threats to institutions and national security are pover-
ty and inequality, the vulnerability of the population faced with natural disasters,
environmental destruction, criminality, organized crime and illegal drug trafficking
[…] At present the Mexican State is not aware of any risks to its sovereignty as a
result of external threats of the traditional type.”
However, in its National Security Law, published in the Diario Oficial (Official
Gazette), January 31, 2005, Mexico defines its national security as “the actions imme-
diately and directly aimed at maintaining the integrity, stability and permanence of
the Mexican state”, referring solely to the preservation of democratic institutions
and leaving aside the multidimensional aspects of security that had been recog-
nized in the National Development Plan. The law also recognizes terrorism, orga-
nized crime and trafficking in chemical, biological and conventional weapons of
mass destruction, among others, as threats to national security, bringing its vision
of security threats closer to that of Mexico’s North American partners (National
Security Law, 2005).
In this way, faced with Mexico’s and Canada’s multidimensional security con-
siderations, the U.S. hegemonic vision emerges and, with a reading of the interna-
tional system based on political realism, sustains that the construction of worldwide
security and the defense of the liberal order rests on the exercise of power and mil-
itary might, preferring coercion and unilateralism.
Nevertheless, Mexico’s case is special. In addition to the primary U.S. concern
about security on the border with Mexico and the porosity of the country’s south-
ern border, the U.S. is also worried about the country’s internal security and stabil-
ity. As Dziedzic points out, “Mexico has become a point of contention for various
geo-social or transnational problems26 that do not respect national borders […] That
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26 Dziedzic understands “geo-social” problems as the new transnational threats to security. They include
international organized crime, terrorist groups, environmental pollution and the massive flow of refugees
and disease.
is why Mexico is –and shall continue being– fundamental for the success of the great
United States strategy” (Dziedzic, 1997).
The security agenda for Mexico designed by the Bush administration includes:
(a) traffic in immigrants; (b) widespread corruption (which would potentially allow
terrorist groups to set up in Mexico); (c) organized crime (drug trafficking, kidnap-
ping, thefts); (d) the lack of maritime control on Mexico’s borders; (e) the possibili-
ty of a terrorist attack on strategic points in Mexico, especially the oil wells (Benítez
and Sánchez, 2004). 
As a result, we can say that the countries of North America recognize certain
common, international threats that require cooperation to be dealt with (particular-
ly terrorism and traffic in drugs, persons and arms), without this meaning that the
views are identical in the sense of sharing a common vision about security, the threats
and the defense of a broader vision. This means that there are a series of minimum
agreements that have made the birth of a security community possible, understood
as the development of mechanisms and the recognition of mutual responsibility for
guaranteeing regional security without necessarily being a full-fledged identity.
The agreements on smart borders were undoubtedly the first step for the creation
of a North American Security Community, which has entered into a new stage since
the March 2005 Waco, Texas meeting that decided that the three countries would pro-
mote a security perimeter in the region through the Security and Prosperity Partnership
of North America (SPP). In the meeting’s final declaration, North America’s leaders
committed themselves to developing a common focus on security issues, reaffirm-
ing the international character of the threats and pointing, once again, to terrorism,
organized crime, drug trafficking and traffic in persons as common threats.
Toward a North American Security Perimeter: 
Borders and Cooperation as Key Issues
Smart Borders: The First Step for the Security Community in North America
The borders are key areas for U.S. security. In both cases, United States-Mexico and
United States-Canada, priorities are different. Whereas in the United States-Canada
relationship, drug trafficking has dominated the agenda, in the case of the U.S.-
Mexico border, together with drugs, migration is a binational security matter. 
NAFTA has increased illegal transborder interactions; this may be attributed to
trade itself and to deficiencies in U.S. drug detection policies along the Mexican
border. The debate between trade liberalization and more policing was made more
flexible in order to not restrict trade growth on the border.
122
ALEJANDRO CHANONA
NORTEAMÉRICA
The numbers speak for themselves: annually, an estimated 350 million people
cross the Mexico-U.S. border (the equivalent of one million people a day); about 90
percent of bilateral trade, almost U.S.$300 billion, flows across the border; and
every year approximately 70 million private vehicles and 4.5 million trucks cross
the border (Mexican Embassy in the United States, 2005). 
In addition, there is the phenomenon of undocumented immigration of Mexican
workers. The most recent estimates calculate that each year approximately 380 000
Mexicans, half of whom have no documents, travel to the United States, either to
stay permanently or temporarily. All this confirms the fact that this is the border
with the most crossings in the world (Creel, 2004). According to the most recent
estimates, these undocumented immigrants send their families in Mexico approxi-
mately U.S.$15 billion a year, a sum that constitutes the country’s second source of
foreign currency, exceeding non-oil exports and foreign direct investment. 
Throughout the twentieth century, border relations between the United States
and Canada have been characterized by cooperation, which has increased since
NAFTA came into effect. The Canadian government has promoted a considerable num-
ber of initiatives in matters of border relations with the U.S., among which is the 1995
Agreement between Canada and the United States on Our Shared Border. In this ini-
tiative, both countries committed themselves to work together to achieve the protec-
tion against illegal and irregular border activities, to facilitate the transit of goods and
persons and to promote international trade. Other measures include the 1997 Border
Vision initiative and the 1999 United States-Canada Association, through which both
governments created a binational mechanism to study common border problems to
harmonize policies and actions with respect to the border and increase efficiency in
crossings of persons and merchandise and in environmental protection. In addition,
corporate, trade and company associations will form a regional business coalition
named “Americans for Better Borders” (Jiménez, Gabriel and Macdonald, 2003).
After the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Canadian government questioned
its ability to face a similar situation, recognizing the need for greater cooperation
with its southern neighbor, not only for safe, proper functioning at the border, but
for establishing concrete actions against any possible terrorist act. Just like in the
Mexican case, the closing of the border and the exhaustive security measures imple-
mented afterward by the United States had a great economic impact, due to the fact
that border crossings were delayed up to 18 hours. Consequently, more than 50
companies from various sectors formed the Coalition for Safe and Efficient Borders
in Trade, declaring at the same time full support for the Canadian government to go
ahead with the necessary coordination and cooperation measures with the United
States to guarantee border security (Beatty, 2002).
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In the case of Mexico, the 1991 establishment of the Border Linking Mechanism
did not imply the development of a long-term vision about border management
between both countries. Designing border measures as answers to immediate prob-
lems and the limited scope of the mechanisms have been constants. In fact, the
transborder initiatives or cooperation policies between Mexico and the United
States have traditionally been conceived as part of the international policies of bor-
der states, which have been developing informally for several years. An example of
this is the relationship between Tijuana, Baja California and San Isidro, California,
where their authorities have established ample cooperative actions that range from
operations to prevent sailors from returning drunk to the United States, to contin-
gency plans to prevent possible attacks with chemical or biological weapons
(Ramos, 2001).
The encouragement for creating common border security stemmed from the
necessities and guidelines marked by U.S. hegemony after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
Before its North American partners, the United States has accepted the impossibil-
ity of unilaterally facing threats to the security of its territory, and has decided to
encourage cooperation and concretizing agreements in the matter.
From the Bush administration’s perspective, security on the border “must be
guided by the principles of co-responsibility, respect to sovereignty, compliance
with constitutional restrictions and protection of human rights and of private life”
(Ridge, 2004: 20). For his government, the fact that land borders have the type of
infrastructure and administration systems that facilitate and guarantee the sus-
tained integration of the economic region in North America has become “a vital ne-
cessity” (Office of International Information Programs, 2003a).
According to Tom Ridge, “in the future the border will be protected through
international cooperation to increase the participation of intelligence information
and face more efficiently the threats presented by terrorism, organized crime, the
illegal traffic of immigrants and narcotics, pests and agricultural diseases, as well
as the destruction of natural resources” (Ridge, 2004: 19). Consequently, in 2003, ap-
proximately U.S.$11 billion were assigned to increase border security, U.S.$2.2
billion more than in 2002. By 2005, the budget assignation for border security in-
creased 5 percent, or U.S.$450 million extra. As a result, the resources earmarked for
border security have increased by U.S.$9 billion since 9/11 (The White House, 2004
and 2005).
The construction of the so-called smart borders was North America’s most
complete immediate institutional response to the threats to its security. By standard-
izing control procedures, smart borders can contain common threats, with which
both public security and economic security will be mutually reinforced. 
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The smart borders initiative is developed through five principles: reinvent the
border; extend economic efficiency; build security resources; share continental and
global security; and develop twenty-first-century institutions. 
The agreement to create a smart border with Mexico was signed March 21,
2002. Unlike the agreement with Canada (which includes 30 specific actions under
four general headings: (a) ensure the transit of persons; (b) ensure the transit of goods;
(c) develop safe infrastructure; and (d) coordinate and exchange information to reach
these objectives), the action plan for the border between Mexico and the United
States only includes 22 actions under three general headings: (a) ensure the transit
of persons; (b) ensure the transit of goods; and (c) develop safe infrastructure.
For Canada, actions aimed at the creation of the smart border appear to strength-
en the cooperation that already existed with its southern neighbor in this matter.
Nevertheless, former Prime Minister Chrétien discarded the idea of a security
perimeter, arguing that its creation “requires a degree of harmonization of policies,
particularly in the area of migration, and the refugees who might infringe Canadian
sovereignty” (Jiménez, Gabriel and Macdonald, 2003). Undoubtedly, cooperation
between the United States and Canada on border security will be in the forefront,
as is shown by the series of pilot projects implemented by Canada to examine Weigh-
In-Motion technology at border crossings with the United States, that uses cutting-
edge technology to gather, analyze and exchange data about traffic flows without
hindering border trade (SPP, 2005).
With regard to port security, beginning in April 2005, the United States and
Canada began implementing the Nexus-Marine Pilot Program at the Windsor-
Detroit crossing to deal with the seasonal flow of small vessels. In this context of
increased cooperation, from May 9 to 11, 2005, both countries carried out three exer-
cises in port security in order to increase joint response capabilities in the case of a
possible terrorist attack, particularly in the Great Lakes region (SPP, 2005).
The smart border between Mexico and the United States is on its way to becom-
ing a reality. To date, a Bilateral Coordinating Committee has been established, an
orientation framework has been agreed on for the protection of infrastructure and
sectoral working groups on energy, telecommunications, transportation, dams,
public health and agriculture have been set up. Mexico’s General Administration of
Customs and the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection created three spe-
cialized working groups (on borders, law enforcement and technology and customs
procedures), which meet every three months and whose main purpose is to improve
the application of Indicator Technology of the Situation of Visitors and Immigrants
to the United States (U.S. Visit) program for the control of entries and exits from the
United States as of December 31, 2003.
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To guarantee the transit of goods along the U.S.-Mexican border the Fast and
Safe Trade (Fast) program,27 designed by the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) was extended to the El Paso border between Mexico and the United
States as of December 4, 2003.
Finally, with regard to the protection of North American air space, in addition
to the discussions opened by the establishment of the Northern Command
(Northcom), in 2004, the United States, Mexico and Canada committed themselves
to creating a Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), which, based on the Global
Positioning System, will favor operational security in aviation.28 In this context, by
2007, authorities hope to design a plan to improve security and efficiency in air nav-
igation in North America (SPP, 2005). 
The Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) 
and the NAFTA Security Perimeter
Although the smart borders strategy was the first step in the creation of the securi-
ty community in North America, it must be pointed out that these are bilateral
agreements, centered on the legal flows of merchandise and persons, and their
main objective is to standardize procedures and promote the security of both U.S.
land borders. This explains the importance of the agreements reached at the Waco
Summit and of the recommendations by the Independent Task Force on the Future
of North America, both oriented toward the creation of a North American security
perimeter that transcends the idea of smart borders, and the definitive push for the
process of construction of the security community.
At the March 2005 Waco summit, the three countries’ heads of state signed the
SPP, a deepening of smart border accords and a decided boost to the construction of
the North American security community. Based on the principle that our security
and prosperity are mutually dependent and complementary, the North American
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27 As of September 2002, the Fast lanes operate at five points of entry on the border between the United States
and Canada: Detroit and Port Huron, Michigan; Buffalo and Champlain, New York; and Blaine,
Washington. To be eligible for the Fast lane, manufacturers, importers and transportation companies must
participate in another program of the CBP against terrorism, the Customs-Trade Association against Ter-
rorism (C-TPAT), according to which companies develop and implement security plans to improve securi-
ty operations. Truck drivers must submit information that will enable CBP officers to evaluate if the
applicant represents any danger. The approved applicants receive a Fast Commercial Driver Identification
Card. The Fast has additional security characteristics on the U.S.-Mexico border. Manufacturers and trans-
portation company drivers who participate in the Fast between the United States and Mexico are required
to use high security mechanical seals on all of the containers or trailers going to the United States. Customs
and Border Protection shall continue examining these deliveries with X-rays, dogs and other equipment
to guarantee the integrity of the Fast program. The CBP also expects the additional security to improve their
continuous efforts to intercept drugs along the border. 
28 In June 2005, authorities predicted setting up 5 WAAS stations in Mexico and Canada before the end of the
summer.
leaders committed to work to develop a common approach to security. The SPP
includes the creation of a security perimeter to combat internal and external threats
to security. This will also enable the implementation of a common model of response
to emergencies that will guarantee the protection of the region’s infrastructure and
ensure efficiency in moving goods and persons.
The SPP security agenda is divided into three main parts: 
(a) Securing North America against external threats. This implies the develop-
ment and implementation of analogous processes for inspecting travelers
and cargo before their exit from a foreign port and in the first port of entry
into North America. The strategies for achieving this include, among other
things, the development of biometric standards, strengthening document
security, exchange of information in real time and the establishment of com-
patible inspection standards. 
(b) Preventing and responding to threats within North America. This means de-
fining equivalent focuses to strengthen security in air, maritime and land
transportation; fighting common threats (terrorism, organized crime, arms
trafficking and migrant smuggling), that includes the response to cross-border
terrorist incidents and natural disasters; increasing cooperation in intelli-
gence matters and developing a common method for protecting infrastruc-
ture. Because of the importance of public border security between Mexico
and the United States, the need to deepen cooperation between both countries
in matters of the administration of justice on the border, prosecuting traf-
fickers’ organizations in order to reduce violence, is vital. 
(c) Streamlining the secure movement of low-risk traffic through our shared bor-
ders. The aim is to deepen the smart border agreements in order to make
infrastructure more efficient and so improve the legal flow of persons and
goods in the region (SPP, 2005).
The idea of the North American security perimeter is also present in the In-
dependent Task Force on the Future of North America’s chairmen’s statement,
released before the Waco meeting. According to the Independent Task Force, it is
necessary to create an Action Plan for the North American Borders, through further
agreements on the smart borders, and to include elements such as the joint inspec-
tion of container vehicles entering North American ports, the creation of a common
approach in the international negotiations related to global movement of people,
cargo and vessels, as well as the harmonization of: (a) visa and asylum policies; (b)
the procedures of identification and tracking of persons, goods and vehicles (iden-
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tified by biometric characteristics); and (c) tracking procedures and monitoring of
exits and of imports and exports; as well as the sharing of transit information (In-
dependent Task Force on the Future of North America, 2005).
The proposal also points out the importance of extending cooperation to the
area of law enforcement and to matters related to defense. However, at least in the
short term, trilateral agreements are not likely to be signed in these matters, given
Canada’s ambiguous position on the subject and, above all, due to the impossibili-
ty of Mexico’s accepting participation in measures such as the creation of a trina-
tional intelligence center on threats, joint training of police forces or participation in
a trinational defense force. As an example, we have Mexico and Canada’s reactions
to the establishment of a Northcom within the framework of restructuring North
American security and defense policies. 
In Mexico, the executive, Congress and the army itself refused any Mexican
participation in Northcom. For the Mexican military, this is normal procedure and
does not involve the country’s military sovereignty (Vallarta, 2002; Davidow, 2002).
Given tradition in the matter of foreign policy and internal conditions, it is clear
that, for the time being, Mexico will not risk participating in any security system
involving direct armed forces participation. Military and security collaboration
with the United States will continue to happen in the fight against drug trafficking
and cooperation, but it will not mean, at least in the short term, greater participa-
tion in international missions, which would be limited to humanitarian assistance
in case of disasters and to nearby areas (Moloeznik, 2001).29
Therefore, today, the armed forces continue their struggle against drug traffick-
ing and organized crime, terrorism and illegal trafficking in arms and persons,
besides helping to solve “the insufficiencies in the poorest areas of our country, where
support is needed in social, educational and health areas” (National Development
Plan, Mexico 2000).
But Canada’s reaction was ambiguous. In principle, Canada defined the com-
mand as an internal U.S. policy; however, the government announced it would
begin a series of consultations with its southern neighbor in this matter. The North
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29 For decades, the Mexican armed forces have systematically helped countries affected by hurricanes,
earthquakes, storms and forest fires. Mexico’s Senate has authorized the military to leave the country for
humanitarian missions. Solidarity work beyond Mexico’s borders has been clear in recent years in the
support given to several Latin American countries: “In 1996, help was given to Costa Rica, Nicaragua and
Cuba, struck by hurricanes, and to Ecuador after an earthquake. In 1998, support was given to Bolivia
when it was hit by an earthquake and to the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala and
El Salvador due to hurricanes; in 1999, help was given to Colombia because of an earthquake and to
Venezuela due to intense rain; and to the Republic of Guatemala, from April 28 to May 4, 2001, to put out
forest fires on ecological reserves in the Department of Petén. In addition to that, the Ministry of the Navy
helped Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador in 1998 after the devastation caused by Hurri-
cane Mitch”. See Moloeznik 2001: 108.
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American Air Space Defense Command (Norad) has served as a framework for sur-
veillance of air routes in the United States and Canada through the Noble Eagle
Operation, which keeps armed airplanes alert for irregular patrolling to identify
and intercept suspect flights.30 However, at the same time, as has already been men-
tioned, Chrétien discarded the idea of a security perimeter, arguing that its creation “re-
quires a degree of harmonization of policies, especially in the area of immigration
and refugees, which might infringe on Canadian sovereignty.” 
Finally, Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin denied any participation of
Canada in the U.S. ballistic missile defense program, thus putting an end to two
years of internal discussions on the issue. However, he confirmed Canada’s com-
mitment to promoting regional cooperation in security matters, by strengthening
borders, reinforcing sovereignty in the Arctic and Canada’s participation in Norad.
Undocumented Immigration and Drug Trafficking 
on the Mexico-United States Agenda: The Ghost of Unilateralism
We must also take into consideration the fact that smart border agreements are in-
tended to guarantee the legal transit of persons and goods, as well as the development
of the adequate infrastructure along both U.S. borders. Consequently, although it is
an important step for the creation of a security perimeter in North America, the
great pending task will continue to be dealing with the issue of the immigration of
Mexican workers (“illegal” for United States, “undocumented” for Mexico) in which
the tendency is that unilateral U.S. actions on cooperation and understanding will
prevail. 
Without a doubt, the United States and Mexico will have to design an ambi-
tious border agenda, which must include migrants, smugglers of people (“polleros”),
smugglers of goods, organized crime, water supply and environmental protection.
After the events of September 11, 2001 most analysts were optimistic in considering
that, in exchange for an immigration agreement, Mexico could be totally coopera-
tive in seeking effective border security (Bailey, 2002).
However, despite the fact that the United States considers illegal migration one
of the threats to its security, the struggle against terrorism and practical actions con-
cerning border security subordinated a possible immigration agreement with Mexico.
30 Between September 2001 and March 2003 there were 27 000 flights to dissuade, prevent and defend them-
selves against potential terrorist attacks besides consolidating interagency cooperation and carrying out
the Plan of North America air surveillance, meaning a greater coordination of the North American Air
Force-Surveillance Council. Also, an agreement to establish a Binational Planning Group for two years was
signed. In this framework Norad has conducted a series of exercise training flights in coordination with
the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration throughout the United States and Canada. See Eberhart, 2003. 
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On the contrary, Tom Ridge has publicly stated that “undocumented aliens are as
dangerous to the United States as terrorists, drug dealers or weapons of mass destruc-
tion” (Nájar, 2004).
The latent concern regarding the possibility that Islamic terrorists may enter
the United States from Mexico became stronger in August 2004 after the arrest of
Farida Goolam Mohamed Ahmed. According to more recent data, between Septem-
ber 1, 2003 and August 2, 2004, the Border Patrol arrested 57 633 non-Mexican im-
migrants and, since 9/11, has arrested 700 immigrants related to terrorist groups.
U.S. attention is still focused on the porosity of the border and, independently
of the Agreement on Smart Borders, it is unilaterally promoting its own border se-
curity agenda by strengthening border controls, which may even lead to the exclusion
or marginalization of its North American partners’ interests. That is the reason for
the importance that Mexico and Canada place on the reinforcement of the dialogue
and cooperation with the United States.31
For Mexican authorities, the way to face the challenge of illegal immigration be-
tween both countries lies in a guest workers’ agreement. However, in the short term,
the possibility of signing an agreement of this kind seems remote, while actions
against immigrants to strengthen U.S. safety measures will continue to increase. 
On the other hand, drug trafficking, and especially the wave of violence that
has broken out in the last few weeks in Mexican border states, is the other difficult
issue in the Mexico-U.S. relationship. Drug trafficking, on the bilateral agenda since
the 1980s, seems to be reaching a point that requires the renewal of cooperative
efforts by both countries to combat it. 
31 There are numerous examples of strengthening of border controls and of antimigrant actions, such as: 
• Greater control along the border with Mexico, the clearest example of which is the Arizona Border
Control (ABC), an operation that aims to strengthen border surveillance, with a budget of half a million
dollars per week. The project includes the use of Predator-type spy planes, an increase of 400 Border
Patrol agents, the establishment of a special camp on the Tohono Indian reservation to concentrate
undocumented migrants and a voluntary repatriation program.
• The strengthening of controls on the Mexican border includes Border Patrol use of rubber bullets and
mustard gas against the migrants, apparently agreed within the framework of the 2001 Action Plan for
Border Security, which has recently been the subject of numerous debates within Mexico.
• The announcement made by former Attorney General Ashcroft concerning the possibility of detaining
any undocumented migrant “for security reasons” indefinitely. 
• The control and even non-recognition of the Mexican consular registry, an identification document that
over 1 200 000 Mexicans in the United States have. 
• The unilateral deportation of undocumented workers detained in Arizona (even chaining their hands
and feet) within the framework of the Lateral Repatriation Program and staging raids in areas where a
large number of undocumented aliens live, such as California.
• House of Representatives passage of the Real ID Act, which argues security reasons to limit political
asylum; modifies a series of uses of the Consular Registration (such as making it insufficient for apply-
ing for a driver’s license and requiring proof of legal residency); authorizes the construction of a 5.5 km
extension of the San Diego security wall (making it a total of 22.4 km long); and requires that the
Department of Homeland Security develop and implement a pilot program to identify and test land
surveillance technologies in Tucson, Arizona.
As I have mentioned before, Mexico’s internal stability is a security issue for
our northern neighbor. Consequently, the United States government has made pub-
lic announcements regarding the violence generated by drug traffickers, in order to
“protect” its citizens who travel to Mexico. 
Thus, on January 26, the State Department issued an announcement alerting its
citizens to the insecurity along the border with Mexico.32 Later, the U.S. ambassa-
dor to Mexico sent a letter pointing to the increase in violence in the border cities
and Mexican authorities’ inability to stop it.33
In view of U.S. announcements and the possibility of having Mexico return to
the list of countries which the United States submits to the process of “anti-drug
certification,” the Mexican government has responded by adhering to its foreign
policy tradition, demanding from its North American partner respect and non-inter-
vention in the internal matters of the country. However, if this reaction from the
Mexican government is not accompanied by a negotiating strategy, it is very likely
that the cooperation between both countries will be subordinated and threatened
by U.S. unilateralism. 
Unfortunately, the disagreements between both governments seem to be pre-
vailing over encouragement for new cooperative actions. Mexico should benefit
from U.S. concern about the security along its northern border and the country’s
general stability by proposing new cooperation programs. President Fox’s govern-
ment has the possibility of opening negotiations with our northern neighbor, result-
ing in the contribution of resources and technology, not only to combat drug
trafficking, but also to shore up attention to other priority issues for our country,
like social exclusion and unemployment, which tend to foster insecurity.
Is a Security Community Possible in North America after New Orleans?
While, as was pointed out above, the SPP document mentioned developing common
strategies for dealing with natural disasters, it is true that the development of the
security community in North America was marked by U.S. concerns about guaran-
teeing the security of its territory: terrorism, drug trafficking and migration were
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32 According to the State Department, 27 United States citizens have been kidnapped, two were murdered
and 11 are still missing. 
33 Among other things, Ambassador Garza said that, “Although violence in border cities is not new, the
fight among groups of drug traffickers is increasing and has resulted in drastic increases of murder and
kidnapping, posing a threat to the integrity of U.S. citizens.” He also expressed his concern regarding “the
local police forces’ inability to combat the drug lords. Kidnapping and violence in general will have a
negative effect on tourism and trade along our borders, which are both vital for the region’s prosperity.”
And he denounced impunity, saying, “The criminals have an impressive arsenal of weapons, since they
know that it is not very likely that they will be caught and punished.”
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the central points on which the three countries’ dialogue centered. However, the
recent natural disasters caused by hurricanes Katrina in New Orleans and Stan and
Wilma in southeastern Mexico may launch a new stage in the construction of the
North American security community. This because they showed that governments
were hard put to deal with this kind of threat to their security and fulfill their basic
function: ensuring the safety of their populations.
In the case of the United States, the security paradigm centered on the fight
against terrorism and the deployment of military capabilities abroad (like the war
in Iraq) has demonstrated its limits given the failed response to the disaster, which
also uncovered the great economic and social inequalities in the most powerful
country on Earth.
Both Mexican troops sent to lend aid in the Katrina emergency,34 and the sup-
port offered by the U.S. government to deal with the devastation caused by Stan
and Wilma35 are important steps in the construction of a security community be-
cause they reinforce solidarity and foster trust between the two countries. 
The increase in interdependence and mutual responsibility, pointed to by
Deutsch as fundamental for the development of the security community, is under-
way in North America. Mexican troops’ being sent to the United States implies this
recognition of mutual responsibility in matters of security and Mexico’s clear belong-
ing to the region of North America. The Mexican government’s reaction, while
based on the need to support the Mexican population in the disaster area, sent a
clear signal of political will to the United States for advancing in the construction
of the security community.
It is true that the debate about Mexico’s participation in a possible regional
security system continues. General Vega has rejected any possibility of participat-
ing in the Northern Command or in the UN peacekeeping missions arguing the
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention (Aranda and Becerril, 2005). Never-
theless, we must remember that joint operations of the armed forces are a higher
stage of the construction of a pluralist security community that implies the devel-
opment of a common identity in matters of security, the perception of security as a
common good, as well as the creation of institutions and mechanisms for coopera-
tion and understanding around this issue.
Based on the possible U.S. recognition of the “other” threats to its security and
the appropriate reaction of the Mexican government, our country has a new win-
34 Mexico’s humanitarian aid operation began September 7, 2005 when 300 troops and 45 military vehicles
were sent to aid Katrina victims in San Antonio.
35 According to the U.S. embassy in Mexico, the total amount of its aid to Mexico for the two natural di-
sasters came to U.S.$600 000. 
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dow of opportunity for furthering the negotiation of priority issues for the integra-
tion of North America like the creation of a social fund, immigration and the gen-
eral framework of regional security that must necessarily reconsider the risks and
threats to it.
If September 11, 2001 was a turning point in the conception of international
security, situating terrorism as the main threat against it, the recent natural disas-
ters that include hurricanes, typhoons, droughts, tsunamis and earthquakes around
the globe may spark a new moment in the conception of security on all levels. The
superpower is ethnocentric and only recognizes threats and weaknesses when it
suffers from them directly. This happened with terrorism, which for years was not
considered the main issue in international security. It is to be hoped that it will now
happen with natural disasters, and that the United States will not waste this new
opportunity to become the leader of a world crusade not only against terrorism, but
against all the real threats to human security: poverty, social exclusion, pandemics
and natural disasters, which create vulnerability worldwide.
CONCLUSIONS
With their respective differences, both North America and the European Union are
immersed in building security communities, triggered by the events of September
11, 2001, and March 2004, two turning points in the processes of integration: the
explicit recognition by the members of each of the blocs that the new security threats
demand not only reinforced cooperation to face them, but also the creation of com-
mon identities in security matters. At the end of the day, even though the construc-
tion of an identity is debatable, the building of a community is unavoidable.
In general, both of these security integration processes could be outlined in the
way described in the table on page 134. 
The European Union of the 25 is clearly on its way toward the consolidation of
a supranational security community, the result of its own integration process, in
which the search for mechanisms to guarantee mutual security and face third par-
ties was always a concern. Although it has had its ups and downs, the European
Union has proven its capacity to come out of its crises greatly strengthened: each
disagreement of the members, which on occasions seemed to lead to splits beyond
repair, ends by becoming the driving force for new agreements and for the consol-
idation of the integration project. 
One of the consequences of the 11-M, 7-J and 21-J attacks is that they finished
closing the gap between the United States and what Rumsfeld coined as “old Europe,”
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Type of security community
Stage of evolution 
Institutions 
Security concept
Border controls and 
immigration
Fight against terrorism 
Police and armed forces
(cooperation and 
coordination)
• Tightly coupled pluralistic secu-
rity community 
(tending toward an amalgamated
security community)
• Ascendant
(moving toward consolidation )
• Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP)
• European Security and
Defense Policy (ESDP)
• Political and Security
Committee
• European Military Committee
• European Military Staff
• Multidimensional 
• European Agency for the
Management of External
Borders
• European Strategic Plan against
Terrorism
• Europol, Eurocorps
• ESDP Missions 
• European Defense Agency
• Loosely coupled pluralistic
security community 
• Nascent
• Mechanisms of consultation
and cooperation 
• Security and Prosperity
Partnership of North America
(SPP)
• Trilateral concerns
• Terrorism, drugs and arms
trafficking, security in borders,
immigration
• Smart Borders Agreements
(bilateral: U.S.-Mex/U.S.-Can)
• United States and Canada
Forum on Trans-Border
Crime (USA-Can) 
• Border Vision (USA-Can)
• Working Group on Security
and Border Cooperation in
the framework of Binational
Commission (Mex-USA) 
• Cooperation (borders, airports
and information)
• Bilateral Consultant Group on
Cooperation against
Terrorism (U.S.-Can) 
• Terrorist Interception Program
(TIP) (U.S.-Can)
• Norad (U.S.-Can)
• Northcom (U.S.) 
• Mexico does not participate
Parameters European Union North America
Table 1
SECURITY INTEGRATION PARAMETERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NORTH AMERICA
represented by France and Germany, opened with the fight against terrorism and
the war in Iraq. Like it or not, the concern about safety was the principal basis of the
accords with a view to the approval of the European Constitution, and it will also
be the motivation for strengthening the two pillars of the union that until now have
been considered fragile, given its dependence on its members’ willingness to cooper-
ate: the CFPS and judicial cooperation. Europe is clearly securitizing its agenda.
The global role of the EU in the next few years (just like that of the United
States) will be defined by the deployment of all its physical and strategic resources
to guarantee the defense of its internal space –equivalent to the U.S.’s homeland
security. For this reason, the risks of a deepening of the securitization of the agen-
das continue to exist and the danger of subordinating the other components of a
multidimensional vision of European security is very feasible.
Just like the in United States, in Europe, the entire legal-political framework for
defending European territory will undoubtedly prejudice individual liberties, the
pride of the Western democracies. Therefore, we are entering into a period of review
not only of European countries’ national security policies, but of a wholesale revi-
sion of the multicultural, inclusionary model of society they felt so proud of.
The theoretical and analytical repercussions of the way that international vio-
lence has changed, personified in the supposed Islamic extremism, for the time being
has the paradigm of social coexistence that amalgamates all Europeans in check.
Their values and principles, the pride of their civilization, are under review and it is
no mere chance that the last call of the Spanish government has been for an alliance
among civilizations, counterposed to the clash of civilizations.
In the case of NAFTA, the conformation of North America on the basis of security
matters is increasing and the framework for a trilateral convergence is there. Although
it is in its initial stage, the recognition of the North American security community shifts
the problem to the definition, conformation and implementation of these policies, put-
ting them in their correct context. Beyond an identity, a community is in the making.
Reality is proving that national interests and threats go beyond our borders,
thus expanding the effects of national security to the space of regional security. The
projection of a regional North American bloc in international politics is far from
being a fact. However, what is happening is that a regional bloc is coming into being
with political progress in the coordination and articulation of actions, although
under U.S. hegemony. 
The security community, in the sense of a common identity and an automatic iden-
tification of common threats in relations among the North American countries, is far
from being explicit. In addition to the historic heritage, Mexico is trapped in a defini-
tion of foreign policy and security; there are differences inherent to the asymmetry
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among the countries, which for economic reasons, such as migration and work, foster
various opposing forms of nationalism that show the divergence of national interests. 
Cooperation of all kinds will deepen among the three nations of North America.
And, once more, Canada will continue to be ahead in deepening cooperation in mil-
itary matters. In the meantime, Mexico will try to safeguard U.S. security by stepping
up its efforts to organize smart borders to make sure that it honors its interest in sup-
porting its neighbor, as well as by maintaining internal stability and a minimum agree-
ment among the country’s political forces. Currently, however, disagreements tend
to prevail over agreements. Nevertheless, one of the highlights of Mexico-U.S. rela-
tions is that Mexico’s economic, political and social stability is a priority for the United
States, a situation which, besides requiring increased cooperation on border securi-
ty matters, opens an important window of opportunity for negotiations with the
Mexican government, including the issues of the multidimensional security agen-
da such as the fight against poverty, diseases and the environmental deterioration.
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